

Moeve

Att: Maarten Wetselaar, CEO

Cepsa Tower

Paseo de la Castellana, 259 A

Madrid, Spain

Brussels, 28.07.2025

REGARDING MOEVE'S POTENTIAL PROJECT IN OCCUPIED WESTERN SAHARA

Dear Mr. Wetselaar,

Western Sahara Resource Watch (WSRW) is privileged to present you with its compliments. We are writing in relation to the recent confirmation by the Moroccan government that land would be accorded to the consortium of Moeve with the Emirati firm Taqa for the production of ammonia and fuel.¹

A press release by the Moroccan government on the matter states that the projects would be rolled out "in three provinces: Laayoune-Sakia El Hamra, Dakhla-Oued Eddahab and Guelmim-Oued Noun."² Most of the land located in these three "provinces" is actually in the part of Western Sahara that Morocco has illegally occupied since 1975.

As such, we wish to humbly request that clarification could be offered about the location of the project. We would be grateful for your response to the questions included further below, preferably by 13 August, as it will allow us to accurately reflect Moeve's relation to Western Sahara in an upcoming publication. The questions are all the more pertinent, given the firm's lack of answers in response to our previous letters on the subject of Moeve's exports of oil and gas to the territory.

To recapitulate the background to our inquiry: the United Nations consider Western Sahara to be a Non-Self-Governing Territory without an administering power in place. The International Court of Justice has confirmed that Morocco has no sovereignty over the territory, and that the people of Western Sahara have a right to self-determination – the right to determine the future status of the territory.³ In 1988, the UN was able to broker a ceasefire arrangement between Morocco and the Western Sahara liberation movement, Polisario, in which both parties agreed to hold a referendum on self-determination.⁴ To that goal, a UN mission (MINURSO) has been deployed to the territory, but it has not been able to organise a referendum as Morocco continues to block any effort that offers a choice beyond integration. In November 2020, the ceasefire collapsed after the Moroccan army seized a section of the UN buffer zone to break up a Saharawi protest.⁵

While well over a hundred of UN Resolutions, and rulings by the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Justice⁶ and the African Court on Human and People's Rights⁷, all underline that Morocco has no

¹ Kingdom of Morocco, Head of Government, 06.03.2025, "The head of government chairs a steering committee meeting on the 'Morocco offer' for green hydrogen", <https://www.cg.gov.ma/en/node/12240>

² Kingdom of Morocco, 07.03.2025, "Govt. Head Hails Green Hydrogen Investor Selection as 'Promising,' Aligned With Royal Vision", <https://www.maroc.ma/en/news/govt-head-hails-green-hydrogen-investor-selection-promising-aligned-royal-vision>

³ International Court of Justice, Western Sahara, <https://www.icj-cij.org/case/61>

⁴ The "settlement proposals" are included in the Report of the UN Secretary General on Western Sahara of June 1990, available here: https://minurso.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unsg_report_18_june_1990.pdf

⁵ WSRW, 19.11.2020, Saharawi gov calls for halt of all activity in Western Sahara over war, <https://wsrw.org/en/news/saharawi-gov-calls-for-halt-of-all-activity-in-western-sahara-over-war>

⁶ All Rulings can be accessed at the site of the EU Court of Justice, <http://curia.europa.eu>.

⁷ African Court on Human and People's Rights, 22.09.2022, Ruling on Application N° 028/2018 <https://www.african-court.org/cpmt/storage/app/uploads/public/632/e0f/3ad/632e0f3ad580e748464681.pdf>

sovereignty or administering mandate over Western Sahara, Morocco continues to militarily control about three-quarters of the territory. Incentivized by its exploitation of the territory's resources, Morocco has little interest to genuinely take part in the UN-mediated peace process. Meanwhile, the lingering conflict continues to have a high human and humanitarian cost: over 170,000 Saharawis are stuck in refugee camps in neighbouring Algeria, surviving in harsh desert conditions and dwindling humanitarian aid. Saharawis who live under the yoke of Morocco's occupation are victims of serious human rights violations that have been reported by the UN Human Rights Committee, UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders, in addition to credible international organisations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and others. In 2023, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights recently lamented the fact that his Office has not been allowed to visit Western Sahara for the last eight years.⁸ Year after year, Western Sahara is ranked among the worst countries and territories in terms of political rights and civil liberties, on par with countries and territories like North Korea, Syria, Afghanistan and Crimea.⁹

The status of the territory comes with repercussions for business activities. As established in 2002 by the UN Legal Counsel at the request of the Security Council, any economic activity in the territory would be in violation of international law if not undertaken in accordance with the wishes and the interests of the people of the territory.¹⁰ We also refer to the conclusions of the UN Treaty Body on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights¹¹ and of the UN Human Rights Committee¹², which have both emphasized the need of obtaining the Saharawi people's "consent to the realization of developmental projects and [resource] extraction operations".

Recent years have witnessed an emerging body of law pertaining to Morocco's claim to the territory, that will impact the possibility of exporting green hydrogen derivatives to European markets.. Since 2015, in ten (!) consecutive rulings, the Court of Justice of the European Union has concluded on the following points as settled:

- The territory of Western Sahara constitutes a territory distinct from that of the Kingdom of Morocco.¹³
- Morocco has no sovereignty¹⁴ or administering mandate¹⁵ over Western Sahara.
- Consequently, the waters adjacent to Western Sahara cannot be regarded as part of the Moroccan fishing zone, territorial waters, exclusive economic zone, or any other notion used to describe Morocco's role vis-à-vis the waters off Western Sahara.¹⁶
- The people of Western Sahara are to be regarded as a third party to the EU's agreements with Morocco, and that as such, no agreement can affect their territory without their consent, as a corollary of the right to self-determination.¹⁷
- The Court is clear that the right to consent resides with the people of Western Sahara, and not with the population of the territory.¹⁸ The Court stipulates that "a majority of the population of Western Sahara is not part of the people holding the right to self-determination, namely the people of Western Sahara. That people, which for the most part has been displaced, is the sole holder of the right to self-determination with regard to the territory of Western Sahara."¹⁹ The Court adds that "there is a difference in that regard between the concept of the 'population' of a non-self-governing

⁸ OHCHR, 07.03.2023, GLOBAL UPDATE: HIGH COMMISSIONER OUTLINES CONCERNS IN OVER 40 COUNTRIES, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2023/03/global-update-high-commissioner-outlines-concerns-over-40-countries>

⁹ Freedom House, <https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores>

¹⁰ UN Security Council, 12.02.2002, Letter dated 29 January 2002 from the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel, addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2002/161, <https://undocs.org/S/2002/161>

¹¹ UN Economic and Social Council, 22.10.2015, Concluding Observations on the fourth periodic report of Morocco, E/C.12/MAR/CO/4*, §6, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fMAR%2fCO%2f4&Lang=en

¹² UN Human Rights Committee, 01.12.2016, Concluding Observations on the sixth periodic report of Morocco, §10, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR/C/MAR/CO/6&Lang=en

¹³ Judgment of 21 December 2016, EU:C:2016:973, §92, and reiterated in the Judgment of 27 February 2018, EU:C:2018:118, §62, Judgment of 4 October 2024,

EU:C:2024:833, §163, Judgment of 4 October 2024, EU:C:2024:839, §85 and Judgment of 4 October, EU:C:2024:835, §134

¹⁴ Judgment of 10 December 2015, EU:T:2015:953, §241. Considered a settled matter in subsequent rulings.

¹⁵ "Account must also be taken of the fact that the Kingdom of Morocco does not have any mandate granted by the UN or by another international body for the administration of that territory, and it is common ground that it does not transmit to the UN information relating to that territory, such as those provided for by Article 73(e) of the UN Charter." Judgment of 10 December 2015, EU:T:2015:953, §233. Considered a settled matter in subsequent rulings.

¹⁶ Judgment of 27 February 2018, EU:C:2018:118, §67-85. Considered settled in subsequent rulings.

¹⁷ Judgment of 21 December 2016, EU:C:2016:973, §104. Reiterated and refined in subsequent rulings.

¹⁸ Judgment of 4 October 2024, EU:C:2024:833, §180-181. Judgment of 4 October 2024, EU:C:2024:835, §152-153.

¹⁹ Judgment of 4 October 2024, EU:C:2024:833, §157. Judgment of 4 October 2024, EU:C:2024:835, §128.

territory and of the ‘people’ of that territory. The latter refers to a political unit which holds the right to self-determination, whereas the concept of ‘population’ refers to the inhabitants of a territory.”²⁰

- The Court has firmly established the position of Front Polisario, the UN-recognised representation of the people of Western Sahara to be able to bring cases before EU Courts on behalf of the Saharawi people, and that it has access to the Court to defend their right to self-determination.²¹
- In Case C-399/22, which specifically dealt with the labelling of products from Western Sahara, the Court again emphasised the separate and distinct status of the territory in relation to Morocco, and concluded that at the stages of import and sale to the consumer, the labelling of the goods from Western Sahara must indicate Western Sahara alone as the country of origin of those goods.²²

Against that backdrop, we have several questions about the decision to commence operations in the territory.

1. What is the location of the land accorded to Moeve and Taqa for their ammonia and fuel production? Is it to the north or the south of the international border between Morocco and Western Sahara?
2. If the land for Moeve’s project is in Western Sahara:
 - a. What steps, if any, has the firm taken to seek the consent of the people of Western Sahara, who have the sovereign rights to the territory in which it is seeking to carry out several projects? Particularly in view of Moeve’s cited sensitivity to “informed consent” as described in its Human Rights Policy.²³ The rights of the people of Western Sahara should of course not be viewed through the concept of FPIC, as they are not an indigenous people with certain rights to a part of a territory in a state that they recognise as such - the people of Western Sahara are the holders of the sovereign rights to Western Sahara as a whole. Their homeland is in part under foreign occupation, but the right to self-determination - the right to decide the status of the territory as a whole, and of the resources harboured therein - lies with the Saharawi people. The UN treats the unresolved conflict in Western Sahara through the right to self-determination as the cornerstone principle, and does not regard this as an indigenous peoples issue.
 - b. How does Moeve assess the potential effects of its projects – carried out on land illegally occupied by Morocco – on the UN peace process, aimed at resolving the conflict in line with the people of Western Sahara’s right to self-determination?
 - c. How does Moeve assess the legal validity of the land allocation by the Moroccan government, given that the Moroccan government has no sovereignty, administering mandate or jurisdiction over the land it allocated?
3. The Human Rights Policy also states that Moeve will comply with the legislation in force in each state that they operate in. Which legislation would Moeve consider to be in force in Western Sahara? Why is Moeve of this opinion?

Our organisation has previously communicated with Cepsa in relation to exports of oil and gas products from Spain to into Western Sahara. Most recently, WSRW asked Cepsa to comment on the shipments in a letter in 21 February 2022.²⁴ Your company responded that “we supply hydrocarbons for distribution in the Saharawi territory, which are fully permitted”²⁵, and noted to WSRW that “we are not commenting further”²⁶, when asked²⁷ which country’s laws and institutions they referred to. WSRW has also written to Cepsa in 2014²⁸, 2017²⁹ and 2018³⁰. A short response from the company on 8 November 2018 failed to answer the questions on that same point³¹.

²⁰ Judgment of 4 October 2024, EU:C:2024:833, §158. Judgment of 4 October 2024, EU:C:2024:835, §129.

²¹ Judgment of 4 October 2024, EU:C:2024:833, §96-138, Judgment of 4 October 2024, EU:C:2024:835, §70-109.

²² Judgment of 4 October 2024, EU:C:2024:839, §89.

²³ Moeve, Human Rights Policy, https://www.moeveglobal.com/stfls/corporativo/FICHEROS/politicas_A4_cepsa_es_human_rights_policy_eng.pdf

²⁴ https://vest-sahara.s3.amazonaws.com/wsrw/feature-images/File/581/622a1a0b3e02f_WSRW-Cepsa_21.02.2022.pdf

²⁵ https://vest-sahara.s3.amazonaws.com/wsrw/feature-images/File/584/622a1a464b19f_CEPSA-WSRW_23.02.2022.jpg

²⁶ https://vest-sahara.s3.amazonaws.com/wsrw/feature-images/File/582/622a1a19688df_CEPSA-WSRW_09.03.2022.jpg

²⁷ https://vest-sahara.s3.amazonaws.com/wsrw/feature-images/File/583/622a1a35c4a0e_WSRW-CEPSA_08.03.2022.jpg

²⁸ https://www.wsrw.org/files/dated/2014-06-06/wsrw-cepsa_02.06.2014.jpg

²⁹ https://www.wsrw.org/files/dated/2020-05-07/wsrw-cepsa_15.06.2017.jpg

³⁰ https://www.wsrw.org/files/dated/2020-06-23/wsrw-cepsa_30.10.2018.png

³¹ https://www.wsrw.org/files/dated/2020-06-23/cepsa-wsrw_08.11.2018.png

4. We notice that shipments of hydrocarbon products have departed from Moeve terminals into Western Sahara during 2024, and will make separate news items on our website regarding this matter later this year. Since the previous communication mentioned above, has Moeve made efforts to obtain consent from the representative of the people of Western Sahara to continue the supplies of hydrocarbon products into the territory?

Thank you in advance for your consideration of our questions. We look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Sara Eyckmans

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